The thesis of Esteban Szmulewicz aims at understanding crisis management in multilevel governance systems, by analysing the relations between central and subnational governments during the Covid-19 crisis. This thesis addresses the pandemic as a stress test for democratic institutions, focusing on decentralization and the territorial distribution of power. It identifies that while some countries implemented highly centralized emergency measures, others operated through decentralized systems, revealing the complexity of managing a crisis across different levels of government. The centrality of these goals relates to a richer understanding of constitutionalism, not only encompassing checks and balances but also approaching a certain ‘positive’ understanding of the State. If so understood, effectiveness and legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing legitimacy, understood as widespread consent, is essential for the effective function of the state, and can provide a ‘reservoir of support’ for institutions and authorities, particularly valuable during crises. The institutional design, particularly the territorial structure or organization of the State, aims at balancing two distinctive but equally crucial values: effectiveness and democratic legitimacy. In terms of the methodological approach, the thesis compares the institutional frameworks of three countries with different degrees and types of decentralization: Chile, Italy, and The Netherlands. This qualitative approach allows control for certain key variables while addressing variation or similarity in terms of the dynamics between the national and subnational governments. The crucial concept for the research is the idea of ‘intergovernmental relations’ (IGR), defined as the relationships between the central government and the regional and local institutions, particularly at the executive branch, highlights the interdependence and interaction that affects both public services delivery and the overall legitimacy of the political system.

The research concluded that IGR influenced each country’s ability to mobilize resources and coordinate efforts. In Chile, a highly centralized response was implemented, with limited local autonomy in decisionmaking, highlighting the challenges of decentralization in crisis governance. In Italy, the existing tensions between central and regional governments were reflected by early disarray in responses. Hence, the central government eventually imposed uniform measures across the country, curbing regional autonomy temporarily.

Finally, in the Netherlands, even though the governance structure provided more flexibility, the centralized recurse to the Safety Regions led to concerns about bypassing democratic institutions. Hence, central government need to be able to properly tackle three types of asymmetries: information asymmetries, administrative asymmetries, and political asymmetries. Although the Dutch system provided a more sophisticated structure for managing multilevel interdependencies than the other two cases, still raised important legitimacy and accountability challenges. Also, the three countries confirmed that the enhanced role of executive leadership at the subnational level has not been properly balanced out by representative and deliberative institutions, a problem exacerbated by severe emergency legislation like in Chile. Also, the thesis critically assesses how emergency measures challenged the principles of democratic legitimacy, considering the use of executive powers during the pandemic often sidelined parliaments and local governments, raising concerns about accountability and transparency. Additionally, temporary institutions and processes might have a medium or even long-term effect, such as the institutionalization of the Safety Council and the weakening of the provinces in the Netherlands, the deepening of the debate about intergovernmental relations and the conference system in Italy, and the need to establish formal vertical coordination with the newly elected regional governments in Chile.
Finally, the diverse legal and public administration traditions influenced the way IGR worked in practice, confirming the discrepancy between the actual practices of governance and the constitutional design of political life, and the need to continue with empirical and interdisciplinary research about these topics.

Szmulewicz defended his thesis on Februari 27th at the Constitutional and Administrative Law Department of Leiden Law School. Supervisor: prof. Wim Voermans, co-supervisor: prof. Geerten Boogaard, both from Leiden Law School.

Esteban Szmulewicz
Governing Decentralised States during the Covid-19 Pandemic: challenges of intergovernmental coordination in Chile, Italy and The Netherlands